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Introduction
On July 22, 2010, the International Court of Justice issued an advisory opin-
ion that affirms (stated more accurately, does not reject) the Accordance with 
International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect 
of Kosovo.1 This was an answer to a request from the United Nations General 
Assembly with a somewhat different title. That is, it was a response to the 
request for an advisory opinion (October 2008 Resolution 63/3)3 regarding 
the question, “Is the unilateral declaration of independence by the Provisional 
Institutions of Self Government of Kosovo2 in accordance with international 
law?” In a 10-to-4 decision, the Court concluded that the adoption of the 
Declaration of Independence on February 17, 2008 did not violate either 
applicable international laws (general international law and the special provi-
sions of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999)) or the 
Constitutional Framework established under the same resolution.4
 This case garnered attention and interest from the outset not only from 
academia, but also in general as a matter that brings up many extremely 
interesting and difficult points of contention involving the formation of a 
nation and a system for diplomatic recognition of a nation (there are quite 
a few countries facing the same issues as Serbia and Kosovo). These points 
include the fulfillment of requirements for Kosovo’s statehood, the assess-
ment of behavior of a non-country, Kosovo’s split from an existing nation 
(Serbia) without agreement and territorial integrity, Kosovo residents’ right 
to self-determination, and the issue of so-called premature recognition by 
other nations. It is safe to say, that reaction is also plainly reflected in the 
Takahide Nagata
202
fact that numerous countries, including all permanent members of the United 
Nations Security Council, participated in written and oral proceedings for 
this case and held discussions.5 However, in regard to the request from the 
General Council, the Court ignored such public concern and not only cast 
off the factor of the “subject’s” aforementioned unilateral declaration of in-
dependence noted above (referring to the part stating, “by the Provisional 
Institutions of Self Government of Kosovo”), but also interpreted and re-
formulated the meaning of the question as, “Is the unilateral declaration of 
independence regarding Kosovo a violation of international law?” (In other 
words, the Court restricted its judgment not to the issue of what the provision 
permits, but to what it prohibits.) Furthermore, various arguments both for 
and against have been evoked due to the statehood of Kosovo — the primary 
focus of public concern, the effect of the unilateral declaration of indepen-
dence despite Serbia not recognizing the split, and the issue of (premature) 
approval from other countries being excluded from the scope of the advisory 
opinion (that is, restricting it solely to the issue of declaring independence6).7
 However, ahead of the issue of whether Kosovo’s unilateral declaration 
of independence was in accordance with international law, the Court unan-
imously agreed on the issue of the existence of jurisdiction, and by a slim 
margin of 9 to 7 affirmed the question of the propriety of exercising jurisdic-
tion (the question of whether the situation calls for exercising discretionary 
power and refraining from issuing an advisory opinion).8 On this point, many 
countries that participated in the proceedings (written, oral) for this case dis-
cussed in detail the issues of jurisdiction and discretion. On the latter point 
(discretion) especially, among those in the minority opinion in the Court, 
there were those that sharply pressed the issue and criticized the majority. 
As will be discussed further later, these controversial points of contention 
involving the character and scope of advisory opinions by the International 
Court of Justice (the substantive issue within the advisory opinion process) 
are just as important as the issue of the aforementioned substantive law. 
Together with picking these apart, the judgment of the majority opinion must 
make a careful assessment and valuation.
 This paper adds to the examination of the important issues concerning the 
state of the advisory function of the International Court of Justice, which has 
not necessarily received sufficient attention due to being overshadowed by 
the controversial point of substantive law that generated such great public 
impact. 
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1. Characteristics involving the issue of Kosovo’s standing
In this case, the direct target of the request for the advisory opinion was the 
unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo, but a key point at its root 
is clearly the issue of Kosovo’s standing. It goes without saying that this so-
called Kosovo issue in its entirety is accompanied by complicated elements 
interlacing various backdrops and dynamics, but given the aim and perspec-
tive of this paper, it is useful to consider the following points.
1.1 The dualistic nature of the issue of Kosovo’s standing
1.1.1 The aspect of the Serbia-Kosovo conflict 
Essentially, the Kosovo issue is a domestic one concerning autonomy (or 
self-determination) within Kosovo (at the time, the Socialist Autonomous 
Province of Kosovo) in the former Yugoslavia (currently, Serbia) whose pop-
ulation is comprised of a high percentage of Albanians. In the process of that 
domestic dispute between the former Yugoslavia and Kosovo, just like other 
constituent countries in the former Yugoslavia, after the end of the Cold War 
Kosovo demanded greater autonomy, and further, to split from the federation. 
Fierce civil conflict ensued. It can be said to have also taken on the character 
of an international (law) issue because the accompanying major issues of 
human-rights law, humanitarian law, and peace and security drew the concern 
and sympathy of the international community.
 Against this backdrop of international focus, Kosovo lost no time declar-
ing independence in 1991. Since at the time the only country to recognize it as 
a nation was Kosovo’s neighbor and ethnic sibling, Albania, this declaration 
of independence was unable to change Kosovo’s standing in international 
law, but at this point conflict between Serbia and Kosovo arose concerning 
Kosovo’s standing, with Kosovo proclaiming its intention to demand sepa-
ration and independence (standing as a new nation) from Serbia, and Serbia 
resolutely refusing.9 This construct must not be overlooked as the starting 
point of the foundation of the Kosovo issue (of standing).
1.1.2 Participation by the United Nations Security Council — Being under UN 
transitional control
Due to the intervention of NATO forces that began in March 1999 (airstrikes) 
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after seeing the terrible humanitarian state in Kosovo, the following year 
the army of the former Yugoslavian Federation and Serbian Armed Forces 
withdrew from Kosovo and a new facet of participation by the UN Security 
Council was added to the character of the circumstances in Kosovo. That is 
to say, as a part of enforcement measures based on Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter, on June 10, 1999, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1244,10 
and based on this resolution, sent the United Nations Interim Administration 
Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) to Kosovo under the direction of a Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.11 This placed 
Kosovo under the transitional control of the UN. “Transitional,” of course, 
encompasses the meaning of being in effect until the final standing of Kosovo 
is determined by the concerned parties; but the same resolution, while “reaf-
firming the commitment of all member states to the sovereignty and territorial 
integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia” (10th paragraph of the pref-
ace), in truth had the effect of brushing aside the governing function of the 
former Yugoslavia (Serbia; without this resolution, the former Yugoslavia 
would have exercised its governing function involved in Kosovo to begin 
with as the ruling power through its administrative organization).12 Although 
a transitional period until the ultimate standing was to be determined, this in 
effect ended influential rule by the former Yugoslavia (Serbia) over Kosovo.13
 While talks continued among parties with the UNMIK as mediator and 
peacemaker, the UNMIK drew up a Constitutional Framework for Kosovo in 
2001 that established the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (PISG) 
to undertake governing functions under the supervision of the UNMIK. 
Thereafter, negotiations took place among the parties concerning the determi-
nation of Kosovo’s ultimate standing, but the breach was so huge that all talks 
broke down between Kosovo, for which independence was a major premise, 
and Serbia, which wholly opposed independence and aimed for a settlement 
of greater autonomy. In 2007, against a backdrop of stabilized PISG govern-
ment, a UN special envoy recommended Kosovo independence to the UN 
under regular international supervision. 
 On February 17, 2008, PISG adopted a unilateral declaration of indepen-
dence for the Republic of Kosovo. Recognition from foreign countries was 
sought in the context noted above. Along with countries such as the United 
States, the United Kingdom, France and Germany, Japan has recognized the 
Republic of Kosovo as a nation.14
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1.2  Peculiarities of the situation leading to the adoption of the General 
Council’s resolution
Serbia immediately responded, stating that the declaration of independence 
was a unilateral split by force from a region of Serbia that produces no legal 
effect either in Serbia or international law. At the same time, the United 
Nations Security Council convened the day after the adoption of the decla-
ration of independence and announced that the National Assembly of Serbia 
had declared it unlawful and ineffective.15 Presumably, Serbia’s labeling of 
the unilateral declaration of independence as “unlawful” is above all related 
to general international law (territorial integrity, right to self-determination) 
and the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244.16
 The UN General Assembly was held on October 8, 2008, and Resolution 
63/3,17 which sought an advisory opinion from the International Court of 
Justice on the issue, as stated at the beginning of this paper, was adopted 
in a tenuous vote count of 77 in favor, 6 opposed, and 74 (including Japan) 
abstaining.18 Serbia, the sole19 sponsor of the resolution, explained the request 
for an opinion as follows.  
“Supporting this draft resolution would also serve to reaffirm a fundamen-
tal principle: the right of any Member State of the United Nations to pose 
a simple, basic question on a matter it considers vitally important to the 
Court. To vote against it would be in effect a vote to deny the right of any 
country to seek — now or in the future — judicial recourse through the 
United Nations system.”20 
 As shown in the votes at the time the resolution was adopted, there was 
a huge disparity in the position taken by each nation concerning Kosovo’s 
declaration of independence. In addition, those opposed to independence, in-
cluding the country of Serbia that had a direct interest, sought a judicial ruling, 
while those countries supporting Kosovo were against this (opposed to voting 
or abstained). Within the UN Security Council, there was a conflict of inter-
est among its permanent members (the United States, the United Kingdom, 
and France against China and Russia) regarding the ultimate standing of 
Kosovo. Thus, as a means to have their position proven correct (the illegality 
of Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence), the countries opposed 
to independence mobilized the General Assembly and attempted to request 
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an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice.21 Notably, the 
fact that it is the country with a direct interest that sought a judicial ruling is 
unquestionably a pattern different from requests for opinion up to that point.22
Another peculiarity, as illustrated in the following statement, the fact that the 
UN General Assembly should treat Serbia as a party to the, as it were, dis-
pute proceedings seems to be outside the bounds of consideration. In reality, 
until then the issue of Kosovo’s standing had not been an agenda topic for 
the General Assembly. That is, following the declaration of independence, 
the General Assembly, which had never even taken up the issue of Kosovo’s 
standing, suddenly adopted the resolution requesting an advisory opinion due 
to a proposal from Serbia. This point will be examined in detail later.
 As noted above, while Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence, 
which became the subject of the advisory opinion in this case, represents a 
manifestation of Kosovo’s issue of standing, first and foremost the funda-
mental and direct parties concerned are Serbia and Kosovo. The construct 
of this being a dispute between these two parties is a primary facet of this 
issue. In addition, Kosovo was placed under UN transitional control after 
the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) because Serbia’s 
practical influential and effective rule was removed. With that framework, 
the self-reliance of Kosovo was promoted while negotiations simultaneously 
proceeded between the concerned parties regarding Kosovo’s ultimate stand-
ing based on intermediation and arbitration by the UN (although this ended in 
failure). Since the Security Council and UNMIK are deeply and substantively 
involved, it is not (only) a simple issue between the parties. 
 Second, the fact that it was Serbia, a country with a direct and the highest 
stake, that spearheaded the request for a resolution requesting an advisory 
opinion in the General Assembly, and the fact that the General Assembly 
adopted the resolution though it had never taken up that issue until that point 
are odd aspects that should be kept in mind as circumstances leading to the 
advisory opinion.
 Now, based on these points, it is possible to examine the approach to juris-
diction and discretionary issues in the Kosovo Advisory Opinion. 
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2.  The Decision on Jurisdiction and Discretion in the 
Kosovo Advisory Opinion and Related Issues
2.1 The majority decision on jurisdiction and discretionary issues
If the request for an advisory opinion is made by a relevant UN organ, the 
International Court of Justice must first consider whether it has jurisdiction 
to issue a requested opinion (issue of jurisdiction) and next, if jurisdiction is 
confirmed, whether there is a reason or reasons for withholding the execution 
of that jurisdiction (issue of discretion).
2.1.1 Jurisdiction
1) Jurisdiction of the person (jurisdiction ratione personae)
In regard to jurisdiction of the person, the Court confirmed its authority to 
submit an advisory opinion based on Article 65, paragraph 1 of the Statute; 
and by invoking Article 96, paragraph 1 of the Charter, which stipulates that, 
“The General Assembly or the Security Council may request the International 
Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question,” the Court 
demonstrated that the General Assembly is an organ permitted to make re-
quests in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations noted in that 
same paragraph or in compliance with said Charter.”23
 The prevailing view of whether such General Assembly authority can be 
restricted by its relationship with the Security Council is a matter of inter-
pretation of Article 12, paragraph 1 in the Charter, which states, “While the 
Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the func-
tions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly shall not make 
any recommendation with regard to that dispute or circumstances unless the 
Security Council so requests.” On this point, the Court quoted a section of the 
advisory opinion on The Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall 
in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (2004)24 and took the stance that “The 
request for an advisory opinion is not an ‘advisory’ by the General Assembly 
regarding ‘conflict or circumstances.’” Article 12 of the Charter may restrict 
the scope of action by the General Assembly taken after an advisory opinion 
is accepted, but that does not limit the authority of the General Assembly 
itself to seek an advisory opinion (Article 96, paragraph 1 of the Charter).25
2) Subject matter jurisdiction (jurisdiction ratione materiae)
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Next, as an issue of subject matter jurisdiction, the Court took up the question 
of whether the request could be considered a “legal question” in the sense 
intended by Article 96 of the Charter and Article 65 of the Statute.
 The General Assembly asked whether the declaration of independence is 
“in accordance with international law,” and the Court affirmed the common 
opinion27 that a question expressly asking the Court whether a special action 
is compatible with international law certainly appears to be a legal question, 
quoting a section of the Advisory Opinion on the Western Sahara (1975).26 
Moreover, as follows, the General Assembly objected to the assertion that the 
declaration of independence is a political act, and its regulation is not inter-
national law but domestic law alone.
 First, regarding whether it is a question of domestic law, the Court as-
serted that in this case the request to the Court for an opinion is questioning 
not whether the declaration of independence complies with any domestic 
law, but with international law, and the Court can reference international 
law without needing to look into any system of domestic law. Concerning 
whether it is a political action, citing relevant judicial precedent, the Court 
noted the fact that a question having political aspects is not enough to deprive 
it of its character as a legal question, and whatever its political aspects, the 
Court cannot refuse to respond to the legal elements of a question seeking the 
implementation of essential judicial duty (in this case, an assessment of an 
act by reference to international law). The Court indicated that the political 
nature of the motives for a request or political implications of opinion have 
no bearing.28
 Thus, the Court concluded that it had the jurisdiction to issue an opinion 
in response to the General Assembly’s request.
2.1.2 Discretion
Next, the Court first outlined its general stance on discretion while citing 
relevant judicial precedent. Namely, the fact that Article 65, paragraph 1 of 
the Statute stipulating, “The Court may give an advisory opinion on any legal 
question,” should be interpreted to mean the Court possesses the discretion-
ary power to decline to give an advisory opinion even if the conditions of 
jurisdiction are met. This discretion protects the “integrity of the Court’s ju-
dicial function and its nature as the principal judicial organ of the United 
Nations.” However, its answer to a request for an advisory opinion “rep-
resents its participation in the activities of the Organization [UN], and, in 
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principle, should not be refused.”29 To satisfy the propriety of the exercise 
of its judicial function, the Court had previously determined that only “com-
pelling reasons” should lead the Court to refuse its opinion in response to a 
request from the General Assembly.30
1) Motive, uselessness, adverse political effects
The Court first addressed (a) motive behind the request and (b) the useless-
ness of the opinion on General Assembly actions, or whether the adverse 
political effects of the opinion would comprise “compelling reasons.” The 
Court repudiated both based on the perspective of the structure of the advi-
sory opinion system.
 (a) The motive behind the request is a point raised by many countries 
that participated in the proceedings in this case. According to these coun-
tries, as shown in the statement by Serbia31, the only advocate of the General 
Assembly Resolution, the opinion was being sought not to assist the General 
Assembly, but to serve the interests of one state and thus the Court should not 
respond. On this point, the advisory jurisdiction is a means to gain the Court’s 
opinion to assist the General Assembly, Security Council, and other bodies 
with authority in their activities, rather than judicial recourse for states. The 
Court’s opinion is given not to states, but to the organ which has requested it. 
Precisely because of this, the motive of an individual state which sponsors, or 
votes in favor of, a resolution requesting an advisory opinion is not relevant 
to the Court’s exercise of its discretion whether or not to respond.32
 (b) The countries that participated in these proceedings stressed that 
Resolution 63/3 does not indicate the General Assembly’s purpose for re-
quiring the Court’s opinion, nor that the opinion has any useful legal effect. 
However, this was not accepted. The determination of whether an opinion 
is required to suitably execute its duty lies with the organ that requested the 
opinion, not the Court, which cannot assess the usefulness of a requested 
opinion in place of the organ seeking the opinion, that is, the General 
Assembly.33 Similarly, regarding the assertion that the opinion might have 
adverse political effects, the Court cannot decide this in place of the organ 
making the request (General Assembly).34 
2) The entity making the request for an advisory opinion — Its relationship 
with the United Nations Security Council
Considering the roles of the Security Council and General Assembly in 
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relation to the circumstances in Kosovo, as the United Nation’s principal 
judicial organ, should the Court have refused to respond to the question be-
cause the request came not from the Security Council but from the General 
Assembly? The Court itself recognized this as “an important point of conten-
tion,” 35 and it has been examined in great detail.
 The circumstances in Kosovo had been the subject of measures by the 
Security Council for over 10 years before the request, as it carried out its 
responsibility of maintaining international peace and security. The Security 
Council adopted Resolution 1244 (1999) to sanction actions such as the 
creation of the UNMIK and prescribe a framework for governing Kosovo. 
Regarding the circumstances in Kosovo, while the General Assembly also 
adopted a resolution regarding human rights conditions, five resolutions prior 
to Security Council Resolution 1244 and one after, as well as 15 resolutions 
concerning UNMIK finances, because the issue of Kosovo’s standing — an 
even broader matter for Kosovo — did not become a topic of discussion for 
the General Assembly, a new agenda topic for deliberation had to be raised 
in September 2008 in order to discuss the proposal to request an opinion. 
Therefore, the contention is that if an opinion could be sought from the Court, 
it should instead be sought by the Security Council, and that this constitutes a 
“compelling reason.” This is based on (a) the nature of the Security Council’s 
involvement and (b) the fact that the Court had to interpret and apply Security 
Council Resolution 1244 (1999) in order to respond to the request.36
 (a) While this request involves an aspect of the circumstances as an issue it 
characterized as involving a threat to international peace and security and has 
become an important matter for the Security Council, that does not signify 
that the General Assembly has no legitimate interest in this issue. Articles 10 
and 11 of the Charter bestow a very broad power on the General Assembly 
to discuss matters within the scope of UN activities. This authority is not 
limited by the responsibility of the Security Council to maintain international 
peace and security given in Article 24, paragraph 1 of the Charter. “Article 
24 refers to a primary, but not necessarily exclusive competence (opinion on 
Wall37).” Though the Security Council has exercised the authority granted 
in Chapter VII of the Charter in regard to the circumstances in Kosovo, that 
does not mean the General Assembly cannot discuss any aspect of those 
circumstances (including the declaration of independence). The limitations 
placed on the General Assembly by the Charter to preserve the role of the 
Security Council (Article 12) restrict the authority of the General Assembly 
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to make recommendations following deliberation, not its authority to engage 
in deliberation. Furthermore, the same article does not prevent the General 
Assembly from taking all actions. There is a growing tendency for the General 
Assembly and Security Council to simultaneously handle the same matter 
when it has to do with maintaining international peace and security, but in 
many cases the Security Council tends to focus on aspects of those matters 
involving international peace and security, while the General Assembly also 
takes humanitarian, social, and economic aspects into consideration to adopt 
an even broader view. This is relevant to the issue of whether the delimitation 
of powers between the Security Council and General Assembly constitutes 
a “compelling reason” to decline responding to the General Assembly’s 
request.38
 Indeed, the facts of this case are quite different from that of Wall. The 
General Assembly actively deliberated the situation in the occupied Palestinian 
territory for several decades prior to the advisory and debated the precise 
subject sought after in the opinion. In the Kosovo case, it was the Security 
Council that actively tackled the circumstances in Kosovo. However, the ob-
jective of the advisory jurisdiction is to enable organs of the United Nations 
and other authorized bodies to obtain opinions from the Court that will assist 
them in the future implementation of their functions. The Court cannot de-
termine what actions the General Assembly might take after receiving the 
Court’s opinion or what effect that opinion might bring in relation to those 
actions. In that case, the fact that only the Security Council has discussed the 
declaration of independence up to this point and that the Security Council 
has been the organ taking action regarding the circumstances in Kosovo does 
not constitute a compelling reason for the Court to refuse to respond to the 
General Assembly’s request.39 
 (b) In addition, the fact that the Court must interpret and apply the provi-
sions of Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) in the course of answering 
the question raised by the General Assembly does not constitute a compelling 
reason not to respond to that question. While the interpretation and appli-
cation of a decision of a political body of the United Nations is, in the first 
place, the responsibility of that organ, as the principal judicial organ of the 
United Nations, the Court has also often had to consider the interpretation and 
legal ramifications of such decisions. Thus, the Court’s undertaking of such 
a task is not incongruous with the integrity of the judicial function. Rather, 
the issue is whether it should decline to accept that task unless the organ 
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(Security Council) that has carried out the said decision (Resolution 1244) 
is the one making the request to the Court. Similar to the advisory opinions 
on Certain Expenses of the United Nations40 and Conditions of Admission of 
a State to Membership in the United Nations,41 when the General Assembly 
has a legitimate interest in answering the request, even if that answer may 
partially hinge on a decision made by the Security Council, that is not reason 
enough to warrant that the Court decline to give an opinion to the General 
Assembly.42 
 Based on the above, the Court concluded there were no compelling rea-
sons for declining to carry out its jurisdiction regarding the request. 
2.2  The general stance on the decision to exercise discretion and its 
possible limitations
Of the above decisions, it may be safely said that there is little argument over 
the portion on jurisdiction (person/subject matter). Actually, all members of 
the Court were in agreement on the existence of jurisdiction. The discussion 
was on the issue of whether discretion should be exercised. 
2.2.1 General stance
Article 65, paragraph 1 of the Statute stipulates, “The Court may give an 
advisory opinion on any legal question.” Even if the conditions of jurisdic-
tion are met, the Court is not obligated to carry this out. This stipulation is 
the starting point for the discretionary issue of whether to issue an advisory 
opinion.
 Unlike the Permanent Court of International Justice which did not have 
a systemic link to the League of Nations, the International Court of Justice 
takes seriously its position as a primary organ of the UN (Article 7, para-
graph 1 of the Charter), and in principle has taken the consistent interpretive 
approach that it should not refuse a request for an opinion unless there are 
“compelling reasons.” Its active response to the request for an opinion by a 
UN organ is precisely its duty as a member of the UN.43 Thus, although called 
“discretion,” judicial precedent can be interpreted as there being a high prob-
ability an advisory opinion will be issued.44
 On the other hand, as the Court itself has repeatedly confirmed, the basis 
for determining whether discretion should be executed and an advisory 
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opinion not issued due to “compelling reasons” is contingent upon whether 
giving an opinion conflicts with the integrity of judicial function; that is, if 
it is at odds with the request/notion of protecting reasonable execution of 
its duty as the Court.45 This is because “The Court, being a Court of Justice, 
cannot, even in giving advisory opinions, depart from the essential rules 
guiding their activity as a Court.”46
 In association with this, the following questions are raised about this issue 
based on three perspectives.
2.2.2 Its possible limitations
1) Conflict between Serbia and Kosovo (aspects of a pending legal matter)
The matter of how to consider the advisory role of the International Court of 
Justice in relation to an existing dispute, namely, an actual pending dispute, 
is still “one of the most problematic areas.”47 In reality, based on the fac-
tual situation, this issue is related to the actual dispute between Serbia and a 
non-state entity (Kosovo).48 While intervention by the Security Council since 
1999 brought new and important elements to the character of the situation, 
the fundamental construct, which is the conflict between Serbia and Kosovo 
that ultimately involves Kosovo’s standing, has not changed.    
 Incidentally, unlike the age of the Court’s predecessor when the Permanent 
Court of International Justice49 existed, there is no function for conflict res-
olution in the advisory opinion system of the International Court of Justice. 
Judicial precedent emphasizes that the objective of the request is not conflict 
resolution based on an advisory opinion (functions prescribed in Chapter VI 
of the Charter), but to obtain necessary legal guidance in the execution of the 
duty of said UN organ.50 Therefore, when the subject of the request for an ad-
visory opinion is closely connected to a conflict between concerned parties, 
the key point becomes how to passively assess the factors of conflict (aspects 
of a pending legal matter). 
 In Wall, the Court pointed out that the General Assembly’s request could 
not only be viewed as an issue between the two parties of Israel and Palestine, 
but that the construction of a wall is also a direct concern for the UN, and that 
the opinion is an issue of especially grave concern for the UN and regarded 
as having a breadth much broader than the two-party dispute. The Court dis-
missed the allegation that aspects of this pending case (opposition by Israel, 
a country that had an interest) constitute “compelling reasons.”51 
 However, this logic (disregarding elements of conflict) significantly 
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expands the power of the General Assembly (the majority) in advisory opin-
ions, and curtails the freedom to choose acceptance by various countries in 
the area of conflict resolution.52 In this kind of problematic situation, the advi-
sory opinion on Kosovo should have also sufficiently examined the elements 
of the conflict, but unfortunately no trace of this can be found. On the other 
hand, as has already been noted, one of the odd aspects of this case is the fact 
that Serbia itself, a party in the dispute, sought the judicial decision of the 
advisory opinion. That is to say, since a country with an interest in the matter 
clearly consented, perhaps the Court did not particularly focus on considering 
the elements of dispute.
 In any case, the issue of how to consider elements of dispute is closely 
related to the point of contention examined next in 2).
2) The General Assembly’s interest in a request for an advisory opinion
In this case, the Court pegged the objective and character of the advisory 
opinion system as “the means by which the General Assembly and the 
Security Council, as well as other organs of the United Nations… may obtain 
the Court’s opinion in order to assist them in their activities.” This stance is 
consistent with judicial precedent set since the elaboration given in the fol-
lowing passage from the Advisory Opinion on the Western Sahara.
“The General Assembly’s objective of bringing before the Court a dispute 
or legal controversy by means of a request for an advisory opinion was 
not to exercise its power or duty to subsequently peacefully settle said 
dispute or controversy. The objective of the request was entirely different. 
The General Assembly sought an advisory opinion from the Court which 
would be of assistance to it for the proper exercise of its functions con-
cerning the decolonization of the territory.”53
 Utilizing this stance, the following two points lose substance.
 (a) Assessment of objective/utility
 First, in this case the assessment of the objective of the opinion request 
and utility in regard to the subject’s own actions were seen as follows. “The 
determination of whether an opinion is required to suitably execute its func-
tions lies with the organ that requested the opinion, not the Court, which 
cannot assess the utility of a requested opinion in place of the organ seeking 
the opinion, that is, the General Assembly.”54 Though this is an interpretive 
approach that completely leaves the assessment of the objective and utility 
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to the said UN organ, it is dubious. If this interpretation is followed, then all 
requests would be treated as the only, and the definitive, evidence of utility to 
said organ. Does that represent exercise of a reasonable judiciary function?
 On this point, in the Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in 
Armed Conflict (request by WHO), in the interpretation of whether seeking 
an opinion is “a legal question arising within the scope of their activities,” 
(Article 96, paragraph 2 of the Charter) the Court should have assessed 
and submitted that the relationship with UN organs other than the General 
Assembly and Security Council is an issue for the requesting organ, but the 
Court itself took the approach of freshly examining the issue and concluded 
that it did not apply.55
 In other words, this is thought to be a presumptive issue. That is to say, the 
assessment of the action (resolution requesting an opinion) of a UN organ is 
primarily the responsibility of said organ, and as long as proper procedures 
are followed, the presumption of utility comes into play,56 but that does not 
eliminate a secondary interpretation/assessment by the Court or other third-
party bodies.
 To be sure, the resolution requesting an opinion from a particular UN 
organ has undergone a proper procedure and as such is a simple and formal 
indicator of an organization’s intent.57 However, isn’t a new assessment by 
the judicial organ, the Court, expected in regard to the primary assessment 
made by the General Assembly illustrated in the request for an opinion, rather 
than an assessment of objective or utility “in place of the General Assembly”?
 (b) The relationship between the interests of the requesting organ and the 
Court’s duty of cooperation in the UN
Second, when the Court accepts the request for an advisory opinion from a 
UN organ, what is it that serves as a guideline and criteria for the judicial 
organ for the purpose of (re)assessing the objective and utility? On that point, 
the argument in the individual opinion given by Judge Keith on this case is 
persuasive.
 Although to date the Court has acknowledged its duty of cooperation as 
a primary organ of the UN (the stance that it should in principle, respond to 
requests because giving advisory opinions constitutes participation in UN 
activities), the Court has not done so indiscriminately. According to Judge 
Keith, it encompasses “critical reason,” and relevant judicial precedents to 
date have acknowledged the general stance by tying to the interest of the 
requesting organ in seeking an opinion from the Court.58 Also, while citing 
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the passage from Wall stating that, “advisory opinions have the purpose of 
furnishing to the requesting organs the elements of law necessary for them in 
their action,” it determined whether “a sufficient interest in the subject matter 
of the request” existed, and when that kind of interest is lacking, the objec-
tive of furnishing elements of law necessary for them in their action does not 
arise. As a result, there is no reason that exists for the Court to cooperate with 
the UN, and at times what is called the Court’s duty to answer ceases to exist. 
In this case, the Court did not have grounds to reach the conclusion that the 
General Assembly possessed the necessary interest.59
 In the Western Sahara conflicts, while obtaining an opinion that would 
help to appropriately execute duty related to the decolonization of the region 
was important to the General Assembly, in Wall the request was made not 
to gain advice on the General Assembly’s obligation to decolonization, but 
based on said opinion, to subsequently execute the authority on conflict.60 
This is precisely the criticism made by Judge Higgins in Wall. 61
 On reflection, in this case, can it be said that it was truly in the interest of 
the General Assembly to ask for an advisory opinion when up to that point it 
had never taken up the topic of Kosovo’s standing (including the unilateral 
declaration of independence)? Though the Court itself stated that the General 
Assembly has a “legitimate interest,” clearly that is regarded as latent or 
on an abstract level. This does not constitute a valid judicial constraint.62 If 
the existence of such an interest is not proven, the Court should have said 
there was no reason to give the General Assembly an opinion on whether 
the unilateral declaration of independence by Kosovo is in accordance with 
international law.
2.2.3 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 as the subject and focal 
point of the examination of accordance with international law
If we postulate that this request had been made by the Security Council, it 
can be imagined that the Court would have issued an opinion on this point 
without any hesitancy whatsoever. Nearly all of the matters that became 
the criteria and target of assessment in this case are related to the Security 
Council (Resolution 1244, UNMIK, Constitutional Framework), while as 
noted above, the General Assembly had not even put the issue of Kosovo’s 
standing on the agenda. In terms of the situation, it can be considered similar 
to the Namibia case where the opinion request came not from the Security 
Council, but from the General Assembly. In that case, too, the Security 
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Council resolution was declared to be “at the center of the request.”63
 As discussed earlier, the majority opinion of the Court concluded that 
the relationship with the Security Council was not a limiting factor on the 
General Assembly’s right to request an opinion. This is particularly so be-
cause the Court affirmed the role of the General Assembly in the area of 
international peace and security for which the Security Council undertakes 
primary responsibility (on the level of action it is secondary, but on the level 
of deliberation it is extremely broad), and because the interpretation and ap-
plication of the special act of the Security Council resolution was emphasized 
to be within the normal scope of judiciary duty.  
 However, on this point the minority opinion thought it problematic that the 
issue could not be simply explained by this type of generalization/formalism. 
For instance, according to Vice President Peter Tomka of the International 
Court of Justice, to answer the issue that was raised, the Court not only has 
to interpret Security Council Resolution 1244, but also must make a determi-
nation regarding whether the action taken by the Kosovo organization is in 
accordance with that resolution and the measures taken based on it (above all, 
the Constitutional Framework). Because of the issues raised by the General 
Assembly, the Court became fully immersed in the clash of opinions within 
the Security Council even though the Security Council was actively taking up 
the problem yet had not asked the Court for advice.64
 Similarly, Judge Keith also focused on the following points, having sum-
marized that the decisive point at issue was whether the request should have 
been made not by the General Assembly, but by the Security Council, and as 
such whether the Court should have declined to answer the question. That 
is, Resolution 1244 adopted by the Security Council, and based on that res-
olution, the role of the Security Council and role of the subsidiary organ, the 
UNMIK, are the very subject of the examination regarding the compliance 
of the declaration of independence to the special act, i.e., said resolution, and 
the actions taken based on it. In contrast to this, the only action of the General 
Assembly that comes to mind with effort after June 1999 and the installa-
tion of an international provisional governing regime is the approval of the 
UNMIK budget.65
 In this way, the Security Council was truly the only organ deeply involved 
in the Kosovo situation. Though provisional, it supervised and regulated the 
situation. Specifically, in view of the fact that it is precisely Resolution 1244 
and the actions taken based on that resolution (including the Constitutional 
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Framework) that were the central subject of the request for an opinion, in a 
case like this, it would have been more likely for the Security Council to be 
the organ making the request.
 The bottom line is that in the advisory opinion for this case, the assessment 
of the Security Council’s involvement (Resolution 1244, interpretation of the 
Constitutional Framework) is far from fractional. Rather, it lies at its core and 
is the principal point. These arguments closely resemble the legal system for 
preserving a third party in pending cases (judicial doctrine of so-called “es-
sential concerned parties,”66 etc.) and seem to raise important elements that 
should be scrutinized in relation to reasonable execution of judicial function.
Conclusion
Through the advisory opinion, this paper has considered the notion of co-
operation in the United Nations and the factors for framing it in light of the 
specific connections in the Kosovo case.
 What can be confirmed anew is that the Court is very steadfast in fulfilling 
its duty of cooperation in the UN by responding to requests for opinions from 
a UN organ. The case of Nuclear Weapons,”67 which concerned the abstract 
issue of the use of nuclear weapons that was highly political in nature, the 
case of Wall68 which dealt with the still ongoing two-party conflict between 
Israel and Palestine involving a so-called separation wall, 68 and the case 
being considered in this paper were all difficult and involved circumstances 
that could have sufficiently enabled a determination of having “compelling 
reasons.” Nevertheless, the majority opinion in the Court took a stance plac-
ing great importance on cooperation with the United Nations. 
 Though it can be said that an advisory opinion has no binding force and 
the recipient is only the organ that requested the opinion, the official interpre-
tation and judgment of an advisory opinion given by the International Court 
of Justice, which is often called the World Court because it can prevail simply 
with such formal logic, is not to be taken lightly.69
 Implementation of the advisory opinion system, by and large, currently 
has a wide access point (receipt of an opinion request) and a narrow exit point 
(judicial answer).70 Even in the opinion in this case, the Court reformulated 
the General Assembly request and limited the overall issue of “accordance 
with international law” to an issue of “the existence of what the provision 
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prohibits,” making it the focus of criticism of theory. At present, the access 
point has been widened to become nearly unrestricted, and a part of the 
Court’s considerable efforts in this case was perhaps whether it could be fit 
into the broader argument (the decision to give an advisory opinion).71
 With that kind of awareness of issues, every one of the probable limiting 
factors concerning the general stance that was examined in relevance to this 
case can be said to have been pertinent to the issue in relation to reasonable 
execution of judicial function (thus, is connected by context of discretion ex-
ecution).72 In particular, the question remains whether the Kosovo Advisory 
Opinion assisted the UN organ (General Assembly) in its activities.73
 Furthermore, the Security Council has been centrally involved in the 
Kosovo situation, and it is precisely the Security Council’s resolution that 
was at the heart and the subject of this advisory opinion. In consideration of 
these points, the circumstances involved in this case can easily be interpreted 
as constituting compelling reasons to refrain from exercising discretion and 
giving an opinion.
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